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NO TES
KIND AND DEGREE OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO CONVICT
OF PERJURY OR SUBORNATION
The crime of perjury has been described in definitive terms as "a
wilful false oath by one who, being lawfully required to depose the
truth in any proceeding in a course of justice, swears absolutely in a
matter of some consequence to the point in question, whether he
believed or not."1 Perjury has always been serious business. In England the crime was first recognized by statute2 at a time when the
taking of an oath was about the most profound thing a man could do,
and its breach was not lightly dismissed.
In Florida perjury and subornation entail identical punishments:
if perjury occurs in a trial on an indictment for a capital crime, the
maximum punishment is life imprisonment; if perjury is committed
under other circumstances, the maximum sentence is twenty years'
imprisonment. 3 In Blackstone's day it was different: 4
"The punishment of perjury and subornation at common law
has been various. It was antiently death; afterwards banishment,
or cutting out the tongue; then forfeiture of goods; and now it
is fine and imprisonment and never more to be capable of bearing testimony. But the statute 5 Eliz. c. 9 (if the offender be
prosecuted thereon) inflicts the penalty of perpetual infamy, and
a fine of 401. on the suborner: and, in default of payment, imprisonment for six months, and to stand with both ears nailed to
the pillory. Perjury itself is thereby punished with six months'
imprisonment, perpetual infamy, and a fine of 201., or to have
both ears nailed to the pillory."
The purpose of this note is to examine the origins and present
characteristics of certain evidentiary problems in perjury and subornation cases. They are, essentially, the number of witnesses required by law to establish certain elements of the crimes - the quantitative problem - and the kind of evidence, direct or circumstantial,
that these witnesses must present - the qualitative problem. The context for the discussion may be found in the following statement by
the authors of American Jurisprudence:5
13 ARCHBOLD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1714, n.1 (8th ed. 1879).

23 HEN. 7, c. 1 (1487).
SFLA. STAT. c. 837 (1955).
42 BLAC

541 AM.

TsONE, COMMENTzARS 0138.
JUL., Peruly §67 (1942).
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"Although it seems once to have been the rule that to support a
conviction for perjury the evidence of two witnesses was required to establish the falsity of the oath on which the indictment was based, it is now well settled that such a conviction
may be had on the evidence of one witness supported by proof
of corroborating circumstances .... "
ANTECEDENTS OF THE RULE

It will not do simply to state that the English common law in 1776
contained a rule that the element of falsity in a prosecution for perjury had to be proved by the direct evidence of two witnesses. In the
first place, the statement may not be entirely accurate; just as important, a glib dismissal of the rule, however stated, as a quaint Anglicism that is absurd on its face fails to explain why this peculiarity lived
on long after similar notions had disappeared from other criminal
trials. It may tax the reader's durability but not the facts to demonstrate that the existence of the rule is bound up inextricably with the
history of the Curia Regis, the Star Chamber, and the reign of Henry
VIII- who must have spent most of his waking hours devising ways
to harass twentieth century lawyers.
It may be fairly stated that the quantitative and qualitative aspects
of the evidentiary rule survived to reach America because the Star
Chamber and not the King's Bench had primary jurisdiction to try
perjury and subornation cases in the sixteenth century. The gulf
between the former, a court oriented toward civil and canon law, and
the latter, a common law court that would have little to do with
Roman peculiarities, was widened by professional jealousy in many
ways; not the least of them was the divergence in methods of proof,
a difference that probably caused the rule to persist in the eighteenth
century.
The Star Chamber had an admirable ancestry. 6 The Council from
which it sprang was the executive and judicial force for the ecclesiastical branch of the old, sprawling Curia Regis 7 - a select body of church
and lay luminaries that from the time of The Conqueror had formed,
with the Crown, the absolute center of authority in the slumbering
empire. The Council was identified with the Crown from its inGSee 1 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 447-526 (7th ed. 1956), for a
detailed account of the origins of the Star Chamber.
,See id. at 1 2 9 for a discussion of the Curia Regis.
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ception; for this reason no love was lost for it by Parliament and the
common law courts. This suspicion was due largely to the uncertain
extent of the Council's judicial power, which has been generally
stated to be:"
"[Clases which turned upon questions outside the jurisdiction
of the common law courts, cases in which the king's interests
were affected, cases in which the process of the common law
courts could not act effectively, and cases in which the law itself
was at fault, were all brought before the Council."
The charitable inclination of the Council to exercise jurisdiction in
the last two situations led eventually to the inspired creation of an
effective antagonist of common law courts, the separate court of
Chancery. 9
By the beginning of the sixteenth century a gradual process was
almost completed whereby the Council split its work into two complementary parts: to its members sitting as the Privy Council went the
executive functions, and to many of the same members who sat under
a starred ceiling at Westminster went most of the judicial functions.
The judicial group came to be recognized as "the king's Council in
the Star Chamber."
Thd crimes of perjury and subornation of perjury were first recognized in 1487 by a statute'0 giving the Star Chamber jurisdiction to
try those cases. In 1562 the first systematic statutory declaration of
the crimes and their punishment was made."' Although the crimes
could be tried in any criminal court, prosecutions almost invariably
were brought in the Star Chamber - probably because of the moral
enormity of the crime.
Firmly embedded in the civil law was the Roman notion that it
took at least two witnesses to prove a fact. 12 Because of its origins and
inclinations the Star Chamber adopted this rule without a murmur.
In the common law courts, however, the quantitative evidence rule
had no function; there simply was no need for it. In the thirteenth
81d. at 478.
9d. at 479.
203 HEN. 7, c. 1 (1487).
15 ELIZ. 1, c. 9 (1562-63), explained in 2 RUSSELL, CRIMES *603-05 (8th Amer.
ed. 1857).
12See 9 HoLuswOaT, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 203 (1938); 7 WIGMORE, EviDENCE §2032 (3d ed. 1940).
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century the hoary common law methods of trials by witnesses, by the
party's oath, by ordeal, and by battle were supplanted by a distant
ancestor of our modern trial by jury. Jurors were not then mere
finders of fact; they were in a very real sense witnesses, for their functions in a case included bringing to bear all facts known to them. The
common law judges maintained a decent ignorance of the ways in
which they obtained their information. In this sense, therefore, there
were as many witnesses as there were jurors; and the quantitative
evidence rule, which did not require more than two witnesses, was
laid in the corner to rust.
At the accession of Henry VIII the Star Chamber was the public
favorite; at his demise it was regarded as a deadly instrument. Although
the political activities for which the Star Chamber is infamous took
but a small portion of its time, the inquisitorial methods used by the
body at the behest of Henry VIII and his immediate successors to the
throne finally caused its destruction by law in 1640.13 Blackstone has
written a definitive statement of the life and times of the Chamber:- 4
"Into this court of king's bench hath reverted all that was good
and salutary of the jurisdiction of the court of starchamber...
which was a court of very antient original, .

.

. consisting of

divers lords spiritual and temporal being privy counsellors,
together with two judges of the courts of common law, without
the intervention of any jury. Their jurisdiction extended legally
over riots, perjury, misbehaviour of sheriffs, and other notorious
misdemeanours contrary to the laws of the land. Yet this was
afterwards (as lord Clarendon informs us) stretched 'to the
asserting of all proclamations and orders of state; to the vindicating of illegal commissions and grants of monopolies; holding
for honourable that which pleased and for just that which
profited; . . . the council-table by proclamations enjoining to

the people that which was not enjoined by the laws, and prohibiting that which was not prohibited; and the star-chamber,
which consisted of the same persons in different rooms, censuring
the breach and disobedience to those proclamations by very great
fines, imprisonments, and corporal severities. . . .' For which
reason it was finally abolished ... to the great joy of the whole

nation."
1s16 CAR. 1, c. 10 (1640).
1'2 BLACSTONE, COMMENTARIES 0266.
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By the sixteenth century the common law courts had seen the
testimony of the first persons who could be called witnesses in the
modern sense. As the jury came to rely more upon the oral testimony
of living witnesses the court in turn came to disregard the jurors as
witnesses themselves. Among the new acquisitions of the King's Bench
from the Star Chamber were jurisdiction over perjury and the civil
law rule that was all but forgotten in that common law court - no fact
may be proved by less than two witnesses. Although the quantitative
rule had never been in issue in the common law courts, the reasons
behind it were not unpopular there; indeed, there is reason to believe
that common law juries were much swayed by the number of "oaths"
heaped upon a given point. It was because of this feeling that the two
witness rule survived in perjury cases. The two witness rule apparently
was lifted from its context of universal application and was given a
new reason for application only in perjury cases: if the prosecution
presents only one witness to the fact of perjury, it is,only "oath
against oath" - an uncertain metaphysical argument that was not
concerned particularly with the jury's dilemma in deciding which
witness to believe, but with the crusty idea that an oath equaled one
oath and no more, that two conflicting oaths actually canceled each
other.
It was mentioned above that two of the alternative methods of
proof in common law courts prior to the thirteenth century advent
of "trial by jury" was "trial by the party's oath, 'with or without fellow
swearers'," and "trial by witnesses."' 15 In each of these methods the
idea was paramount that a person's oath was one unit of probative
weight; it therefore followed - as a scientific fact, if you accept the
major premise - that credibility in the modern sense was unheard of
and that the oath of the Duke of Roaringham on one side could be
canceled by the oath of the village tramp on the other. Even with the
concomitant growth of the modem trial by jury and the use of witnesses whose credibility was open to inspection, the quantitative
theory of evidence did not disappear completely. Juries in the seventeenth century were still prone to "weigh" the evidence.
Mr. Wigmore has described the acceptance of the two witness rule
6
in perjury cases by the King's Bench:'
15THAYER, EVIDENCE 16 (1898); see also the discussion in I HoLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 299-312 (7th ed. 1956).
167 'WIGMORE,EVIDENCE §2040 (3d ed. 1940). Professor Wigmore's is by far the

best current statement of the history of the evidentiary rules in perjury and
subornation.
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"[A] charge of perjury was the one case where a plausible inducement for such a rule was presented; because in all other
criminal cases the accused could not testify, and thus one oath
for the prosecution was in any case something as against nothing;
but on a charge of perjury the accused's oath was always in
effect in evidence, and thus, if but one witness was offered, there
would be merely ... oath against oath."
This explanation may in fact bridge the gap between the Star Chamber
and the King's Bench in 1640; if it does, it describes a shift in reasoning
by the common law judges. The common law courts had theretofore
been concerned with the metaphysical balancing of an oath on one side
in a case by an oath on the other side of the same case; Mr. Wigmore's
explanation assumes that the same balancing occurred when the prosecution introduced both oaths in the perjury trial of a silent defendant:
one oath by a prosecution witness to prove the falsity of another oath
given by the defendant at some earlier time. Whether this thought explains the actual reason for the retention of the rule after the abolition
of the Star Chamber or just the later rationalization, it is doubtless
the explanation given by eighteenth century English courts as well
as by modern American courts that find it necessary 7 to justify the rule
and its relatively recent exceptions and refinements.
Nineteenth century writers sought with indifferent success to
describe the characteristics of the surviving quantitative evidence
rule; about all they were able to agree on was that there is something to the "oath against oath" argument. Mr. Starkie stated:' 8
"To convict a man of perjury, a probable and credible witness
is not sufficient, but it must be a strong and clear evidence, and
more numerous than the evidence given for the defendant, for
And semble, that
otherwise there is but oath against oath ....
the contradiction must be given by two direct witnesses, and that
the negative supported by one direct witness and by circumstantial evidence would not be sufficient."
17See, in summation, 9 HoLnswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 207 (1938):
"The requirement of two witnesses in the case of perjury is due to two main causes.
In the first place, the offense was developed in the court of Star Chamber, where the
tendency to the adoption of the civil and canon law rule had always been stronger.
In the second place, the requirement of more than one oath against another oath
is a particularly obvious measure of justice .... "
182

STARxIE, EvIDENCE

859, n. (q) (7th Amer. ed. 1842).
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Starkie's reference to .the "more numerous" evidence of the prosecution indicates an awareness of the original "oath as a unit of probity"
theory of the common law courts, and his statement of the two witness
rule blends in the categorical civil law rule of the Star Chamber. He
based the latter conclusion quoted upon something that he "heard"
from Lord Tenterden; Mr. Best,19 writing in 1849, seemed to doubt
that Starkie was being quite frank in his report of the Tenterden
position and pointed to nineteenth century English decisions to show
that one witness directly contradicting the defendant's sworn description of an event is sufficient to convict if he is corroborated by circumstantial evidence.
As the original reason for the two witness rule became more and
more obscure with the passage of time, its attraction diminished and
the rule was relaxed to permit conviction if the prosecution produced
one witness to refute directly the substance of the defendant's sworn
statement, plus "corroborating circumstances equal to another wit20
ness."
What had begun as a purely quantitative rule in the Star Chamber
-a rule stating how many witnesses would have to testify to convict
a man for perjury - became a rule with qualitative as well as quantitative aspects - stating the kind of evidence, direct or circumstantial,
that the witnesses had to give.
The American trend toward destruction of the vestiges of the
rule will be described and evaluated in the main section of this note.
The question is whether any direct, as distinguished from circumstantial, evidence is required and whether the quantitative aspects of
the rule are honored by modem courts. It must be admitted that the
line between "direct" and "circumstantial" evidence is a shadowy one
indeed. Theoretically, a man who was on the corner of Elm and Main
Streets at noon and did not see Jones cannot testify directly that
Jones was not there, but in close cases whatever qualitative requirement a court feels it must honor can be satisfied simply by calling the
circumstantial evidence direct in nature. Professor Wigmore 2 1 fur19BFsr, EVIDENCF 0439 (1849): "But this decision, if it ever took place, is most
certainly not law. It is a startling thing to proclaim openly, that so long as a man can
cloign all direct, he may defy all circumstantial evidence, and commit perjury with
impunity; and we accordingly find a contrary doctrine laid down in a variety of
cases."

20See this language- of doubtful meaning - in Kier v. State, 152 Fla. 389, 393, 11
So.2d 886, 888 (1943) (dictum).
211 W
oGPso,,
EVmENCE §§24, 25 (3d ed. 1940).
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ther documents the hazy distinction between direct and circumstantial
evidence. Nevertheless, for purposes of a working definition, it may be
said that a witness can testify directly of a fact in issue only when he
asserts knowledge of the fact through the operation of his senses. On
the other hand, he can testify indirectly, or circumstantially, of the
fact in issue if he claims direct knowledge of a fact that infers the
existence or nonexistence of the fact in issue.
ELEMENT OF FALSITY IN PERJURY CASES

The majority of the jurisdictions in the United States, which reiterate the rule that the falsity of the oath must be proved by "the
testimony of more than one witness or by the testimony of one witness
and corroborating circumstances,"22 give no indication of the kind
of evidence required of the minimum number of witnesses or of
the dimensions of the term "corroborative circumstances." 2 3 Assuming that there is an intentional distinction made between the type
of evidence required of the one direct witness and that demanded by
the corroborating circumstances, it seems clear that circumstantial
evidence, however introduced into evidence, is intended by the "corroborating circumstances" language. If the evidence required is not
circumstantial, it must be direct; and we are transported back to the
eighteenth century requirement of the direct testimony of two witnesses.
In fairness to most of these courts it must be stated that they have
not been confronted with the problem of circumstantial evidence
as opposed to direct evidence. There is a significant scarcity of cases
in which it was necessary for the court to state, as a matter of law, the
type of evidence the minimum number of witnesses must give. In a case
of first impression in Delaware24 Justice Rodney, after discussing the
ZL2State v. Crowley, 226 S.C. 472, 474, 85 S.E.2d 714, 716 (1955). "[LI]t should be

observed that this rule does not extend to all the facts, which are necessary to be
proved on the trial of an indictment for perjury; but only to the proof of the
falsity of the matter upon which the perjury is assigned. Thus, the holding of
the court, the proceedings in it, the administering the oath, and even the evidence
given by the defendant, may all be proved by one witness." 2 RUSSELL, CRIMES 9654
(8th Amer. ed. 1857).
23E.g., Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 156 A.L.R. 496 (1945); People '.
O'Donnell, 132 Cal. App.2d 840, 283 P.2d 714 (1955); Rader v. State, 52 So.2d 105
(Fla. 1951); State v. Rogers, 149 Me. 32, 98 A.2d 655 (1953); State v. Bulach, 10 N.J.

Super. 107, 76 A.2d 692 (App. Div. 1950); State v. Crowley, 226 S.C. 472, 85 S.E.2d
714 (1955).
24Marvel v. State, 33 Del. 110, 113, 131 Atl. 317, 318 (1925).
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early two witness version of the quantitative rule, stated, "Later cases
have, however, generally held that one witness giving positive evidence
is sufficient if supported by corroborating circumstances." Continuing,
he stated that "in most of the cases so holding, however, the courts have
contented themselves with a general statement of the rule and were
not confronted with the presence of circumstantial evidence alone.
Most courts have been confronted by questions as to the 25number of
the witnesses, rather than the character of the evidence."
It cannot be seriously doubted that the qualitative aspect of the
two witness rule in its more popular days required that the testimony
of each witness directly refute the substance of the defendant's oath.2 6
When the pristine rule was relaxed to allow convictions on the testimony of one corroborated witness, no one could consistently argue that
there had to be direct evidence from more than one witness. It is
28
27
the reasonable import of the common dicta as well as the holdings
of most courts actually faced with the problem that the single requisite
witness must directly refute the defendant's oath.
The rule of one witness plus corroboration has on its face no qualitative requirement for direct evidence; its qualitative aspect was supplied without changing the common statement of the rule. At least two
courts have been given statutes as clean slates to write upon. The
Texas codification 29 of the quantitative requirement of one witness
plus corroboration was interpreted by the court to allow a conviction
on circumstantial evidence alone. The California court, given a similar statute,2 0 stuck by the requirement of direct evidence from at least
one witness.
In areas in which the falsity of the oath is not susceptible of proof
2533 Del. at 116, 131 Ad. at 319.

26See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
2See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
2
EVIDENCE
See cases collected in 41 Ass. JUR., Perjury §67, n.18 (1942); 7 WIGmsoao,
§2042, nA (1940).
2 Txx. CODE CRssr. PRoc. art. 723 (1948): "In trials for perjury . . . no person
shall be convicted except upon the testimony of two credible witnesses, or of one
credible witness corroborated strongly by other evidence as to the falsity of the
"
See Plummer v. State, 35 Tex. 202, 33
defendant's statement under oath ...
S.w. 228 (1895).
30CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. §1968 (Deering 1946): "Perjury . .. must be proved by
testimony of more than one witness .... [P]erjury [must be proved by] the testimony of two witnesses, or one witness and corroborating circumstances." Essentially
the same provision is contained in CAT_ PEN. CODE §1103a (Deering 1949). See People
v. O'Donnell, 132 Cal. App.2d 840, 283 P.2d 714 (1955).
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by direct, extrinsic evidence, some jurisdictions have recognized exceptions to the qualitative requirement of direct evidence, whether offered
by one witness or two. Justice Wayne declared in Wood v. United
States31 that the qualitative requirement applied only in cases in
which oral testimony was relied on and not to situations in which the
only proof possible was documentary. The New York court, another
adherent to the qualitative rule of direct evidence, convicted a man
of perjuring himself by saying "I don't remember" by presenting strong
circumstantial evidence that he did remember. 3 2 These cases, it should
be noted, are not those in which the prosecution was simply unable to
produce direct evidence of facts contradicting the defendant's sworn
statement; these are cases in which the falsity of the statement was in3 3
These states, while still adherently insusceptible of direct proof.

hering to the hard rule of two witnesses or one with corroboration, have
at least suffered a crack to be made in the stern facade of stare decisis.
In the last half-century a few courts faced with perjury convictions
on purely circumstantial evidence in cases of first impression have unshackled themselves from the past and upheld the convictions.- 4 Their
decisions generally are based on the refutation of the rule's common
law basis and a feeling that the crime of perjury is no more heinous
than the crime of murder and should not be more difficult of conviction. 35 The degree of circumstantial evidence required for conviction is not clear, but an indication may be garnered from State v.
on circumCerfoglio.3 6 The Nevada court first upheld a conviction
37
stating:
rehearing,
on
reversed
then
stantial evidence,
"While we adhere to the general proposition that the crime
of perjury may be established by circumstantial evidence, we
have reached the conclusion that there is not in the instant case
3139 U.S. (14 Pet.) 430 (1840); see also Mallard v. State, 19 Ga. App. 99, 90 S.E.
1044 (1916).
32People v. Doody, 172 N.Y. 165, 64 N.E. 807 (1902).
33See State v. Wooley, 109 Vt. 53, 192 At. 1 (1937).
34Marvel v. State, 33 Del. 110, 131 At. 317 (1925); Blakely v. Commonwealth, 183
Ky. 493, 209 S.W. 516 (1919) (false swearing); People v. Dowdall, 124 Mich. 166, 82
N.W. 810 (1900); State v. Storey, 148 Minn. 398, 182 N.W. 613 (1921); State v.
Cerfoglio, infra note 36; Metcalf v. State, 8 Okla. Crim. 605, 129 Pac. 675 (1913).
3
sState v. Storey, 148 Minn. 398, 182 N.W. 613 (1921).
3646 Nev. 348, 213 Pac. 102, reversing on rehearing 46 Nev. 332, 205 Pac. 741
(1923).
3746 Nev. 332, 350, 213 Pac. 102 (1923).
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that clear, strong, and satisfactory proof of the crime charged
which is necessary to a conviction."
In summation, the evidentiary rules in perjury cases have evolved
in several steps. Initially the direct testimony of two witnesses was required. With the passage of time this requirement has been relaxed to
allow convictions based on the direct testimony of one witness and
corroboration by circumstances "equal to another witness." The Flor
38
ida Court has not yet been called upon to go beyond this point. Exceptional cases - those in which the element of falsity is not susceptible
of direct proof - have come to be successfully prosecuted on circumstantial evidence alone. And, recently, a handful of courts have placed
perjury on a par with other crimes, requiring only circumstantial ev dence for conviction.
SUBORNATION OF PERJURY

Subornation of perjury has been defined as the procurement of perjured testimony.39 There are two elements of the crime: perjured
testimony by the one suborned and procurement of the testimony
by the defendant.40
Proof of the first element of this crime thus includes proof of the
commission of perjury. With the exception of one jurisdiction 4 1 it
has been held that the evidentiary rule to prove the falsity of the
oath in a subornation prosecution is the same as is necessary to prove
the falsity of the oath in a perjury prosecution.42 In the excepted
state, Missouri, it was held 43 that both of the elements of the crime may
be proved by one uncorroborated witness- in this case the -suborned
perjurer -even though to prove the falsity of the oath in a perjury
prosecution the one witness plus corroboration rule applied. No sub38E.g., Rader v. State, 52 So.2d 105 (Fla. 1951); Keir v. State, 152 Fla. 389, 11 So.2d
886 (1943); Hall v. State, 136 Fla. 644, 187 So. 392 (1939); Tindall v. State, 99 Fla.
1132, 128 So. 494 (1930); Yarborough v. State, 79 Fla. 256, 83 So. 873 (1920);
McClerkin v. State, 20 Fla. 879 (1884).
30PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 209 (1952).
4
OState v. Fahey, 19 Dcl. 594, 54 At. 690 (1902); Bell v. State, 5 Ga. App. 701, 63
S.E. 860 (1909).
41State v. Richardson, 248 Mo. 563, 154 S.W. 735 (1913).
42E.g., Hammer v. United States, 271 U1.S. 620 (1926); Bell v. State, 5 Ga. App.
701, 63 S.E. 860 (1909); Commonwealth v. Fine, 321 Mass. 299, 73 N.E.2d 250 (1947);
State v. Sailor, 240 N.C. 113, 81 S.E.2d 191 (1954); State v. Corporale, 16 N.J. 373, 108
A.2d 841 (1954).
4State v. Richardson, 248 Mo. 563, 154 S.W. 735 (1913).
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ornation cases were found in those jurisdictions that hold that the
false oath in perjury prosecutions may be proved by circumstantial
evidence. Consistency would dictate, however, that the same requirement be respected in proving the perjury element of the crime of
subornation.
The suborning element is treated like the elements of other crimes;
the ordinary rules of proof of an issue apply. The Missouri court
summed this up when it stated, "All of the authorities hold that a
single witness, uncorroborated, can make sufficient proof of the suborning."

4
4

Many pages of reported opinions have been devoted to explanations why the original two witness rule is inapplicable to the suborning element; they fail to state, however, the kind and degree of
evidence that one lone witness may give to warrant a conviction. Although the inference is that the witness' evidence may be circumstantial, research has brought to light only one case in which circum45
With
stantial evidence of suborning was held sufficient to convict.
this sole exception all the cases found in which a subornation conviction was upheld contained the direct testimony of the recanting perjurer. It does not necessarily follow, however, that a court having only
circumstantial evidence available would be reluctant to hold the
proferred testimony sufficient to convict, if this testimony showed the
suborning element beyond a reasonable doubt.
The only Florida case 46 on subornation of perjury reaching the
Supreme Court was not decided on evidentiary grounds; thus there i5
no basis for predicating the position the Court might take. Con441d. at 571, 154 S.W. at 737. Contra, People v. Evans, 40 N.Y. (I Hand) * I
(1869), in which the uncorroborated testimony of the perjurer was held legally insufficient to convict the alleged suborner. In reversing the conviction the court
of appeals observed, id. at *5, "The jury must by their verdict convict Near of
perjury, for this is the very question to be tried; and after they have done that,
to place their verdict of the defendant's guilt in suborning him upon the sole uncorroborated evidence of this perjured witness .... " In conclusion, the court remarked, id. at *7, that "no jury should ever have the opportunity given them
by any court to render so disgraceful a verdict in a court of justice as this. The
jury are required literally to stultify themselves." In deciding the Richardson case
the Missouri court distinquished Evans and pointed out that New York had since
retreated from this position; but even subsequent to the Richardson case the United
States Supreme Court cited Evans with approval and reached an identical result.
Hammer v. United States, 271 U.S. 620 (1926).
45Babcock v. United States, 34 Fed. 873 (C.G.D. Colo. 1888).
46Milligan v. State, 103 Fla. 295, 137 So. 388 (1931).
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sidering, however, the long line of Florida decisions following the
majority rule in perjury cases, it is reasonable to assume that the majority rule would be adhered to in a subornation prosecution.
CONCLUSION

The persistence of the common law fetish of "oath against oath,"
embodied in the rule that requires the direct testimony of at least one
witness plus corroborative evidence, is a tribute to the stolidity of the
judiciary and the legislature. Now that the accused is competent to
testify in his own behalf in all criminal prosecutions and the weight of
proof is determined by credibility rather than number of witnesses,
the "oath against oath" anomaly can be justified only on a historical
basis. In the present legal generation it is a throwback. This fact is
suggested even by courts that still adhere to the quantitative rule in
some form.4 7 Even California, staunch adherent to the two witness or
one plus corroboration rule that she is, admits that "there has been
growing dissatisfaction with the somewhat anomalous and technical
rules of evidence hedging about a prosecution for perjury."48
It has been suggested that law enforcement depends on the cooperation of society and that this co-operation will be enhanced by
protecting a witness from the threat of vengeful accusations of perjury
by a defeated litigant. 40 That this end may be achieved by the present
majority view will be conceded; it is suggested, however, that this
rule may also encourage perjury by making conviction so difficult
that it provides an added stimulus to one disposed to fabrication. Discarding the majority rule might well have the effect of reducing the
number of witnesses willing to testify "at their risk." The basic question then arises: Does the protection afforded a witness warrant the
difficulty of conviction of perjury? Although as yet only a few courts
have answered this in the negative, all courts eventually will be faced
with an inescapable reappraisal of the quantitative and qualitative
rules of evidence in perjury and subornation cases.
CHARLES V.

MARSHALL

D.

O'CONNOR

FRANCIS

47"It may well be doubted whether any distinction should now be made between

the proof necessary to convict of perjury and that necessary to convict of other
crimes." Coins v. United States, 99 F.2d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1938), cert. dismissed, 306

U.S. 622 (1939).

48people v. O!Donnell, 132 Cal. App.2d 840, 844, 283 P.2d 714, 717 (1955).
49Bws, EvmEtcE 0436-37 (1849).
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